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This paper uses the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)-type of estimator of Arellano
and Bond (1991) to analyze the dynamics of adjustment in foreign aid allocation over the
period 2000-2005. The empirical findings reveal a complex nature of foreign aid allocations.
On the one hand, the static panel data models indicated that aid donors tended to provide
larger amounts of foreign aid to the poorer developing nations which were in a greater need
for the development assistance. On the other hand, the dynamic panel data models indicated
contradicted results, where relatively wealthy developing countries have received larger
amounts of foreign aid.
Citation: Furuoka, Fumitaka, (2008) "A Dynamic Model of Foreign Aid Allocation." Economics Bulletin, Vol. 15, No. 8 pp.
1-13
Submitted: April 7, 2008.  Accepted: June 11, 2008.
URL: http://economicsbulletin.vanderbilt.edu/2008/volume15/EB-08O10012A.pdf1. Introduction 
Developed countries have been allocating vast amounts of funds as foreign aid to 
developing nations. For example, in 2006, the 22 member countries of the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) disbursed US$103.9 billion as foreign aid. Among the 
DAC countries, the United States was the top aid donor in 2006 providing US$22.7 
billion as foreign aid. The second biggest donor in 2006 was the United Kingdom that 
distributed US$12.6 billion as foreign aid. It was followed by Japan that disbursed 
US$11.6 billion as foreign aid. (OECD, 2007). 
 
International movement of such a vast amount of money has attracted keen attention of 
researchers. The efficacy of Official Development Assistance (ODA) programs by 
developed countries has been subject to scrutiny and criticism. Some researchers 
maintained that foreign aid did not “work” and had not been able to help achieve the 
desired economic development in aid recipient countries (Bauer, 1981; Friedman, 1958; 
Mosley, 1987).  
 
Another aspect of foreign aid activities that has attracted a lot of criticism is the 
allocation of foreign aid funds. The main line of argumentation used by the ODA critics 
has been that aid donor countries fail to provide foreign aid to the needy countries. The 
criticism has been so widespread that even standard textbooks on economic development 
include a discussion on this issue. For example, Todaro (2000) argued that foreign aid 
was allocated in an “arbitrary way” and “the allocation of foreign aid is rarely determined 
by the relative needs of developing countries” (p.593).  
 
Taking into account the criticisms regarding foreign and allocations briefly outlined 
above and the recent changes and tendencies in the movement of foreign aid funds, this 
paper aims to examine whether aid donors allocated their foreign aid according to the 
needs of aid recipient countries. This paper uses the Generalised Method of Moments 
(GMM)-type of estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991) to analyse the dynamics of 
adjustment in foreign aid allocation over the period 2000-2005.
1
       
Numerous quantitative research studies have been done on foreign aid allocations 
(Bandyopadhyay & Wall, 2006; Burnside & Dollar, 2000; Cingranelli & Pasquarello, 
1985; Dudley & Montmarquette, 1976; Furuoka, 2005; Neumayer, 2003; Svensson, 
2000; Trumbull & Wall, 1994). However, these studies could not reach an unambiguous 
conclusion regarding foreign aid allocations and the results that the studies yielded were 
often contradictory.    
 
An earlier study on the developed countries’ ODA allocation was conducted by OECD 
(1969) and it reported one peculiar tendency in ODA allocations, which was the “small 
country effect” or the “population bias”. However, Dudley and Montmarquette (1976), 
did not agree with this conclusion and argued that “an important result is that there is no 
uniform evidence of distortion in the direction of small beneficiary countries” (p.140). On 
the other hand, Trumbull and Wall’s (1994) reported that evidence supporting the “small 
                                                 
1 The paper uses the Dynamic Panel Data (DPD) soffware package for estimating dynamic panel data 
model.    
  1country effect” was present when the researchers used the one-way fixed effects model. 
However, when the two-way fixed effects model was used, no significant relationship 
between the aid allocations and the size of population was detected.  
 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) argued that the smaller developing countries “get more aid” 
(p.862). Svensson (2000) reached a similar conclusion and pointed out that the log of 
population was “highly significant” (p.450). However, Neumayer (2003) concluded, 
“Most donors, particularly the small ones, select more populous countries with higher 
probability” (Neumayer, 2003, p.658).      
 
The relationship between foreign aid allocations and per capita income in the recipient 
countries is yet one more feature in the aid giving activities that has generated a 
considerable research interest (Bandyopadhyay & Wall, 2006; Dudley & Montmarquette, 
1976; Trumbull & Wall, 1994). Dudley and Montmarquette (1976) concluded, “The 
model suggested that the probability of granting aid was a decreasing function of the 
recipient’s per capita income” (Dudley and Montmarquette, 1976, p.142). Trumbull and 
Wall (1994) also reported a significant negative relationship in the one-way fixed effects 
model; however, the two-way fixed effects model detected a negative but non-significant 
relationship between the variables.  
 
Among the more recent academic inquiries on the topic,  Bandyopadhyay and Wall 
(2006) produced evidence that aid flows tended to respond negatively to per capita 
incomes in aid recipient countries and concluded that there was a negative  relationship 
between aid allocations and income levels in the recipient countries, which was “in 
contrast with much of the existing literature” (p.13).         
 
Among individual aid donor countries, US bilateral aid allocations have been thoroughly 
researched. The findings of these studies were contradictory. For example, Shoultz 
(1981) concluded that there had been no connection between US foreign aid flows and 
human rights conditions in aid recipient countries. In a similar vein, Stohl, Carleton, and 
Johnson (1984) maintained that no obvious relation could be found between the aid 
recipients’ observance of human rights and US aid allocations. However, Cingranelly and 
Pasquarello’s (1985) study that used cross-country econometric model reported that 
human rights situation in aid recipients had influenced the allocations of US foreign aid.  
 
Some researchers have focused on Japan’s ODA activities (Furuoka, 2005; Hook & 
Zhang, 1998; Katada & McKeown, 1998). Hook and Zhang (1998) concluded that 
Japanese aid allocations were motivated by the donor country’s interests rather than the 
recipient countries’ needs. Katada and McKeown (1998) agreed that Japan’s ODA 
program was not motivated by the recipient countries’ needs as they found no significant 
relationship between per capita income in aid recipients and Japanese aid flows. On other 
hand, Furuoka (2005) concluded, “The findings reveal the lack of evidence to prove that 
human rights condition in aid recipient countries has influenced the allocation of 
Japanese aid” (p.125). However, this conclusion is in sharp contrast to Neumayer’s 
(2003) study that identified Japan as one of two aid donor countries that allocated more 
foreign aid to the developing nations with better human rights record.  
  22. Data and Methodology 
This paper uses the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM)-type of estimator of 
Arellano and Bond (1991) to analyse the dynamics of adjustment in foreign aid allocation 
over the period 2000-2005. The main source of data is World Bank’s internet database -- 
World Development Index Data-Query (World Bank, 2007). The panel consists of one 
hundred fifty two (152) aid recipient countries. This includes all the developing countries 
in six regions, i.e. 1) East Asia and the Pacific, 24 countries, 2) Europe and Central Asia, 
27 countries, 3) Latin America and the Caribbean, 31 countries, 4) Middle East and North 
Africa, 14 countries, 5) South Asia, 8 countries, 6) Sub-Saharan Africa, 48 countries.  
 
In the current study, ODA allocations are hypothesized to be determined by four factors, 
i.e., 1) aid recipients’ income (GNI), 2) aid recipients’ debt services (TDS), 3) aid 
recipients’ terms of trade (TT), and 4) aid recipients’ populations (POP). First of all, 
income level in aid recipient countries could be an important determinant for aid 
allocations because the countries with low per capita incomes have a greater need for 
foreign aid compared to the lower-middle income countries or the higher-middle income 
countries. This study hypothesises that the countries with lower per capita Gross National 
Income (GNI) received bigger amounts of foreign aid.    
 
Secondly, aid donors might be inclined to provide larger amounts of foreign aid to the 
recipient countries that are burdened with heavy external debts and suffer from the 
deteriorating terms of trade. Low saving rate and high current account deficit are among 
the reasons why developing countries accumulate external debt. The main cost associated 
with the accumulation of external debts can be described as “debt service” (Todaro, 2000, 
pp. 549-550).
2 Thirdly, developing countries are vulnerable to the declines in the terms of 
primary commodity trade. In the 1950s, Prebisch (1950) and Singer (1950) warned that 
there had been a secular decline in the terms of trade. More recently, Todaro (2000) 
pointed out that “empirical studies suggest that real primary-product prices have declined 
at an average annual rate of 0.6% since 1900” (p.446).           
 
Finally, the size of population is important to consider because more populous 
developing countries may need greater amounts of foreign aid. Also, these countries are 
more likely to experience higher unemployment rates and lower productivity. Large 
population has been considered an impediment for the developing countries’ economic 
growth. According to Simon (1997), there has been consensus that large population in a 
developing country could lead to a reduction in machinery and infrastructure per person, 
and hence to a reduction in output per person.        
 
To incorporate the four factors discussed above, there will be one dependent and four 
independent variables in the model, and the foreign aid allocation function could take a 
form: 
 
LODAit =  f (LGNIit, LTDSit , LTTit, LPOPit),      (1) 
 
                                                 
2 The debt service is the sum of principal repayments and interest (World Bank, 2007). 
  3where LODAit  is the natural log of the amount of Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) per capita to recipient country i in year t; it includes loans made on concessional 
terms as well as grants; the amount is denominated in US dollars. LGNIit is the natural 
log of  Gross National Income (GNI) per capita in recipient country i in year t; the 
amount is in US dollars. LTDSit is the natural log of the percentage of total debt services 
in the total amount of exports of goods and services in recipient country i in year t. Total 
debt services include the sum of principal repayment and interest. LTTit is the natural log 
of the net barter terms of trade. The net barter terms of trade is the percentage ratio of the 
export prices to the import prices in aid recipient country i in year t. The base year is 
2000, where the terms of trade index is set at 100. In the following year, the index is 
measured relative to the base year. LPOPit is the natural log of the total population in 
recipient country i in year t.
3  
 
Three separate methods are used in the present study to analyse the following four 
models: 1) restricted model, 2) period-specific fixed effects model, and 3) period-specific 
random effects model, 4) dynamic panel data model. This paper did not include recipient-
effects in the model. There are three main reasons for this model specification. Firstly, 
the number of recipient countries included in this study is 152. Estimation of recipient-
specific fixed effects could cause an enormous loss of the degree of freedom. Secondly, 
the two-way fixed effects model which includes both recipient-effects and period-effects 
could cause multicollinearity problems among the regressors (Baltagi, 2005). Thirdly, 
there are missing data due to a fact that many developing countries are unable to maintain 
good statistical data sets; the estimation of a two-way random effects model for the 
balanced data cannot be easily extended to the unbalanced data. Finally, the foreign aid 
allocation can be dynamic in nature. The usage of dynamic panel data model can allow 
researchers to better understand the dynamics of adjustment (Baltagi, 2005).  
 
The restricted model contains only a constant term: 
 
yit = α + xit′β+ εit ,                       (1) 
 
where yit is the regressand; α is the constant; xit is the K regressor vector; β is the K ×1 
slope vector; εit is the error term; K is the number of regressors.  
 
Panel data analysis is better suited for the cases where there exist unobservable period-
effects. If the period-effects are correlated with the regressors, the fixed-effects model 
could be used. On the other hand, if the period-effects are not correlated with the 
regressors, the random-effects model could be used (Greene, 2003). In order to 
incorporate period-specific effects, the fixed effects model could take a form:  
 
yit = α + αt + xit′β+ εit ,           (2) 
 
                                                 
3 For more detail on the definition of variables, see World Bank (2007).  In the World Bank’s database, 
ODAit is codified as “DT.ODA.ALLD.CD”, GNIit as “NY.GNP.PCAP.CD”, TTit as “TT.PRI.MRCH.WD”, 
TDSit as “DT.TDS.DECT.EX.ZS”, POPit as “SP.POP.TOTL”.  
  4where αt is the period-specific fixed effects. The fixed effect model could be transformed 
into a vector form: 
 
 y =α ιNT  + Zαα + xβ+ εit ,                                  (3) 
 
where ιNT is the NT-element unit vector; N is the number of recipient countries; T is the 
number of years; y is the NT × 1 matrix; x is the NT ×K matrix. Furthermore, Zαα could 
be expressed as: 
 
Zαα = (IT ⊗ ιM) α                                                     (4) 
 
where IT  is the T-element identify matrix; ⊗  is the Kronecker Product; ΙM is the M-
element unit vector; α is the vector of period-effects, i.e. α′= (α1 α2 α3…..αT); Zα is the 
matrix of period-specific dummy that one may include in the regression to estimate αt 
(Baltagi, 2005). For example, if the number of recipient countries is two (N = 2) and the 
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On the other hand, the period-specific random effects model could be written as: 
 
yit = α + ut + xit′β+ εit ,                                                                 (7) 
 
where ut is the period-specific random effects. The period-specific random effects model 
could be estimated by using Feasible Generalized Least Square (FGLS) estimation. The 
slope parameters in this model could be express as:  
  5y x x x
1 1 1 ) ( ˆ − − − Ω ′ Ω ′ = β ,                                                        (8) 
 
where Ω is the disturbance covariance matrix. The present paper uses two methods to 
estimate the disturbance covariance matrix. Wallace and Hussain (1966) suggested that 
the residuals from the restricted model (1) could be used for the estimation of the 
covariance matrix. On the other hand, Wansbeek and Kapteyn (1989) suggested using the 
residual from the fixed-effects model (2). 
 
The dynamic panel data models can be expressed as 
 
yit = α + yi,t-1 + αt + xi,t′β+ εit ,           (9) 
 
These dynamic panel data models of foreign aid allocation are characterised by presence 
of lagged dependent variable among the regressors (Baltagi, 2005).   
    
3. Empirical Results 
Results of the static panel data estimation are reported in Table 1. The multiple 
coefficient of determination (R
2) in the restricted model is 0.556. In the period-specific 
fixed effects model, R
2 is 0.568. In the Wallace and Hussain estimation for the period-
specific random effects model, R
2 is 0.564. In the Wansbeek and Kapteyn estimation for 
the random effects model, R
2 is 0.564.  
 
This is an interesting finding because all the four estimations produced very similar 
results. Firstly, there is a very strong significant negative relationship between LODA and 
LGNI. This means that aid donors tended to give less foreign aid to the relatively wealthy 
developing nations. Secondly, the results indicate a very strong significant negative 
relationship between LODA and LPOP. This means that aid donors allocated smaller 
amounts of foreign aid to the more populous developing countries. Another interesting 
finding of the current study is that a significant positive relationship between LODA and 
LTT was detected. This means that the developing countries with more favourable terms 
















  6Table 1: Static Panel Data Estimation 
Dependent variable:       LODA 



























































Constant  9.947 
(8.466)** 
 
10.539  10.343 
(8.774)** 
10.355 
(8.784)**  (8.905)** 
Overall 
Significance(F test) 
189.31** 87.64**  195.74**  194.84** 
R
2 0.556 0.568  0.564  0.564 
Adjusted R
2 0.553 0.561  0.561  0.561 
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics 
** indicates significance at the 0.01 level 
 
Results of the dynamic panel data estimation are reported in Table 2. The first Wald test 
is used to test the joint significance of all regressors, except time dummies. The null 
hypothesis that the estimated coefficients are simultaneously zero is rejected at the 0.05 
significance level. On the other hand, the second Wald test is used to test the joint 
significance of time dummies, including the constant in the first-differenced model. The 
null hypothesis could not be rejected.  
 
The Sargan test of over-identifying restriction is reported. The null hypothesis of the 
validity of the instrument could be rejected. The AR test for order 1 indicates that null 
hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelation is rejected at the 0.01 level of significance. 
On the other hand, AR test for order 1 shows that null hypothesis of no second-order 
autocorrelation could not be rejected. These findings are considered to be important 
because the consistency of GMM estimator relied upon the fact of no second-order 
autocorrelation for the disturbances of the first-differenced equation (Baltagi, 2005).       
 
The Table 2 reports a very interesting fact that there is a significant positive relationship 
between LODA and LGNI. This means that aid donors tended to give more foreign aid to 
the relatively wealthy developing nations. It implies that over the observation period 
  72000-2005 aid donors tended to give more foreign aid to the relatively wealthy 
developing nations. In other words, relatively rich developing countries which needed 
less foreign aid tended to receive greater amounts of the development assistance. This 
finding is sharply contradicted with the findings of some previous studies 
(Bandyopadhyay & Wall, 2006; Trumbull & Wall, 1994). 
 
Table 2: Dynamic Panel Data Estimation 
Dependent variable:       LODA 
LODA(-1)  0.051 
(0.71) 
 
Wald test  
(joint) 
11.34* 
LGNI  0.493 
(2.18)* 
 
Wald test  
(time dummy) 
2.719 
LTDS  0.086 
(0.06) 
 
Sargan test  10.11 
LTT  0.621 
(1.85) 
 
AR(1) test  -3.529** 
LPOP  0.649 
(0.48) 
 
AR(2) test  0.080 
Constant  0.081   
(1.47) 
 
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics 
** indicates significance at the 0.01 level 
* indicates significance at the 0.05 level 
 
 
In short, the findings of the panel data analysis revealed a highly complex nature of 
foreign aid allocations. Thus, on the one hand, the static panel data models indicated that 
aid donors tended to provide larger amounts of foreign aid to the poorer developing 
nations which were in a greater need for the development assistance. On the other hand, 
the dynamic panel data models indicated contradicted results, where relatively wealthy 
developing countries have received larger amounts of foreign aid.  
 
4. Conclusion 
The current paper aimed to explore the main determinants of foreign aid allocations, 
including bilateral and multilateral foreign aid, over the period 2000-2005 using both the 
static and dynamic panel data model. The analysis of the static panel data model yielded 
four main findings. Firstly, the poorer developing countries did tend to receive larger 
amounts of foreign aid. Secondly, relatively small in terms of population developing 
countries received more foreign aid from the aid donors, which provided additional 
evidence in support of the “small country effect”. Thirdly, developing countries with 
  8more favourable terms of trade received more foreign aid than the countries with less 
favourable terms of trade. Fourthly, no empirical evidence was found to support the 
hypothesis that the developing countries with heavier debt burden were allocated larger 
chunks of foreign aid. However, the analysis of the dynamic panel data models showed 
the contradicted results. The aid donors tended to give more foreign aid to the relatively 
wealthy developing nations      
 
The empirical findings reveal a complex nature of foreign aid allocations. On the one 
hand, the static panel data models indicated that aid donors tended to provide larger 
amounts of foreign aid to the poorer developing nations which were in a greater need for 
the development assistance. On the other hand, the dynamic panel data models indicated 
contradicted results, where relatively wealthy developing countries have received larger 
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  11Appendix 1 
List of Developing Countries Included in this Study 
 
I) East Asia and Pacific (Developing countries only), 24 countries 
1) American Samoa, 2) Cambodia, 3) China, 4) Fiji, 5) Indonesia, 6) Kiribati,7) Korea, 
Dem. Rep., 8) Lao PDR, 9) Malaysia, 10) Marshall Islands, 11) Micronesia, Fed. Sts.,  
12) Mongolia, 13) Myanmar, 14) Northern Mariana Islands, 15) Palau, 16) Papua New 
Guinea,17) Philippines, 18) Samoa, 19) Solomon Islands, 20) Thailand, 21) Timor-Leste, 
22) Tonga, 23) Vanuatu, 24) Vietnam 
  
 II) Europe and Central Asia (Developing countries only), 27 countries 
1) Albania, 2) Armenia, 3) Azerbaijan, 4) Belarus, 5) Bosnia and Herzegovina,  
6) Bulgaria, 7) Croatia, 8) Czech Republic, 9) Estonia, 10) Georgia, 11) Hungary,  
12) Kazakhstan, 13) Kyrgyz Republic, 14) Latvia, 15) Lithuania, 16) Macedonia,  
FYR, 17) Moldova, 18) Poland, 19) Romania, 20) Russian Federation, 21) Serbia and 
Montenegro, 22) Slovak Republic, 23) Tajikistan, 24) Turkey, 25) Turkmenistan, 26) 
Ukraine, 27) Uzbekistan 
 
III) Latin America and the Caribbean (Developing countries only), 31 countries 
1) Argentina, 2) Barbados, 3) Belize, 4) Bolivia, 5) Brazil, 6) Chile, 7) Colombia,  
8) Costa Rica, 9) Cuba, 10) Dominica, 11) Dominican Republic, 12) Ecuador, 13) El 
Salvador, 14) Grenada, 15) Guatemala, 16) Guyana, 17) Haiti, 18) Honduras,  
19) Jamaica, 20) Mexico, 21) Nicaragua, 22) Panama, 23) Paraguay, 24) Peru, 25) St. 
Kitts and Nevis, 26) St. Lucia, 27) St. Vincent and the Grenadines, 28) Suriname, 29) 
Trinidad and Tobago, 30) Uruguay, 31)Venezuela, RB 
 
IV) Middle-East and North Africa (Developing countries only), 14 countries 
1)Algeria, 2)Djibouti, 3)Egypt, Arab Rep., 4)Iran, Islamic Rep., 5)Iraq, 6)Jordan, 
7)Lebanon, 8)Libya, 9)Morocco, 10)Oman, 11)Syrian Arab Republic, 12)Tunisia 
13)West Bank and Gaza, 14)Yemen, Rep. 
     
V) South Asia, 8 countries 
1) Afghanistan, 2) Bangladesh, 3) Bhutan, 4) India, 5) Maldives, 6) Nepal, 7) Pakistan,  
8) Sri Lanka 
 
VI) Sub-Saharan Africa, 48 countries 
1) Angola, 2) Benin, 3) Botswana, 4) Burkina Faso, 5) Burundi, 6) Cameroon, 7) Cape 
Verde, 8) Central African Republic, 9) Chad, 10) Comoros, 11) Congo, Dem. Rep.,  
12) Congo, Rep., 13) Cote d'Ivoire, 14) Equatorial Guinea, 15) Eritrea, 16) Ethiopia,  
17) Gabon, 18) The Gambia, 19) Ghana, 20) Guinea, 21) Guinea-Bissau, 22) Kenya,  
23) Lesotho, 24) Liberia, 25) Madagascar, 26) Malawi, 27) Mali, 28) Mauritania,  
29) Mauritius, 30) Mayotte, 31) Mozambique, 32) Namibia, 33) Niger, 34) Nigeria,  
35) Rwanda, 36) Sao Tome and Principe, 37) Senegal, 38) Seychelles, 39) Sierra Leone, 
40) Somalia, 41) South Africa, 42) Sudan, 43) Swaziland, 44) Tanzania, 45) Togo,  
46) Uganda, 47) Zambia, 48) Zimbabwe. 
  12